How Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia Led To His Downfall


How Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia Led To His Downfall
Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Russia was a major factor in his downfall. In 1812, Napoleon, whose alliance with Alexander I had disintegrated, launched an invasion into Russia that ended in a disastrous retreat from Moscow. Thereafter, all of Europe, including his own allies, Austria and Prussia, united against him. Although he continued to fight, the odds he faced were impossible. In April 1814, Napoleon’s own marshals refused to continue the struggle and stepped down from their positions. During the actual Russian campaign, there were many key factors that greatly impacted his downfall. The largest army ever assembled for one single invasion was reduced to a mere fraction of its original size. Because of the rebellions from his allies, Austria and Prussia, Napoleon had to fight a war on both the western and the eastern front. The losses he suffered in Russia greatly affected his future campaigns. Throughout his reign, Napoleon was able to overcome many obstacles that others before him could have only dreamed. One was the idea of having a United Europe under France. With his Grand Armée, Napoleon had already conquered, and was controlling an enormous amount of Europe, such as Switzerland, the Confederation of the Rhine, Austria, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Broers, 47). These countries, or provinces, made up the bulk of central Europe. Napoleon had recently ended a war with Spain, and now had signed a peace treaty with them. In 1805, France, under Napoleon, and Russia, under Alexander I, signed the Treaty of Tilsit. The treaty was one of peace under certain conditions. Russia was prohibited to trade with England, and they were also obligated to turn over some of their land to France (Elting, 63). The territory that France gained control over was the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The treaty was extremely harsh on Russia. The prohibition of trade with England greatly affected the economy of Russia. The Continental System, which Napoleon instituted, prohibited trade with England. Alexander I violated the Treaty of Tilsit by renewing trade with England. Napoleon invaded Russia in an attempt to force Czar Alexander I to abide by the Treaty of Tilsit (Web, Russian Embassy). The summer of 1812 was an ideal time for Napoleon to begin an invasion. Russia’s economy was weak due to the trade embargo and other internal problems. The infrastructure of Russia was at a technological disadvantage, which would later be more of a burden to Napoleon than an advantage. The artillery and small arms were years behind that of France. The Russian army was a conscription army, meaning that local farmers had to furnish a certain number of surfs for military service, as opposed to a professional, trained army where the government supplies the soldiers with all of their needs. An amazing half-million soldiers had enlisted in Napoleon’s Grand Armée (Saglamer, Beginning of the March). This was the largest army gathered for one single invasion. Russia’s army was out numbered 3:1 with only one hundred-seventy thousand soldiers. Not only was the Russian army not well trained, they were also ill equipped. Napoleon recognized that it would be difficult and extremely slow for Russia to mobilize her army due to her enormous size and weak infrastructure. If Napoleon invaded now, he knew that he could be well into the Russian territory before meeting any major opposition. On June 24, 1812, Napoleon began his fatal Russian campaign. The Grand Armée, led by Napoleon, crossed the Nieman River, into Russia. On the journey to Moscow, Napoleon met virtually no major opposition. The first stop in the campaign was Kovono. Early into the campaign, the Grand Armée was affected by a colic epidemic that claimed the life of nine thousand horses and thousands of soldiers (Web, Russian Embassy). This slowed the pace of the army. Harsh weather conditions caused the dry roads to turn to mud, making it extremely difficult to maneuver the large artillery cannons and wagons. The city was easily captured; the Russians had previously retreated. After a day’s rest, Napoleon and his troops continued to the city of Vilna. The march from the River Niemen was tougher than expected. Once again, hot and rainy weather turned the poor quality roads into muddy tracks that rendered the carriages impossible to move. Damp weather did not help the situation of disease. Soldiers and horses suffered from sickness and malnutrition. The poorly built Russian bridges could not support the heavy load of cannons and soldiers; consequently, the bridges gave way (Saglamer, Vilna). Napoleon had trained his troops to gather food from the surroundings, which in turn made the packs lighter. The little food the troops carried was eaten in a matter of days, due to their disobedience. The road did not offer any source of nutrition for the starving soldiers in the march. Dead horses thrown in by the Russians had polluted the wells. Vilna was captured on June 28, 1812. Unfortunately Vilna provided little for the army's needs. The Russians abandoning the town had destroyed Vilna’s stores and houses. The rest of the stores were exhausted within the first day. Napoleon pushed his troops to their limits. Throughout the next month, he marched them from Vilna to Viasma, a total of close to two hundred miles. He captured three major cities, and there was virtually no opposition. The first major battle that Napoleon and his troops fought in was at Smolensk on August 17 (Elting, 79). One week prior to his arrival in Viasma, Napoleon reached the highly fortified city of Smolensk. The battle itself was quick and decisive. Napoleon was able to conquer the town in only one day. The loses that Napoleon suffered were catastrophic. In just the one-day of fighting, the Russians killed ten thousand to twelve thousand soldiers, about one hundred fifty artillery cannons, and close to five thousand horses. From the beginning of Napoleon’s Russian invasion to his current position, he had lost one-fifth, or one hundred thousand of his soldiers, half of his major artillery, and approximately twenty-five thousand horses (Saglamer, Smolensk). This greatly slowed his pace. Originally, Napoleon planned to have his troops in Moscow in seven weeks. Due to the great losses suffered, Napoleon was unable to complete this goal in the time he had allotted. This unplanned delay forced Napoleon’s troops to march great distances under the extreme temperatures of the summer. All of Napoleon’s troops were issued wool uniforms. As a result of the hot and humid weather conditions, soldiers striped from the wool jackets and pants to just there undergarments (Elting, 22). Although rewarding at the time, it would later prove to be a fatal mistake. Prior to reaching Moscow, there was another major battle. The battle of Boridino was the bloodiest battle that Napoleon and his troops had ever seen. Napoleon's army consisted of one hundred thousand infantry, twenty-eight thousand cavalry and five hundred and ninety cannons. The Russian army under the command of General Kutuzov consisted of seventy-two thousand regular infantry, ten thousand semi-trained militia, seventeen thousand cavalry, seven thousand Cossacks and six hundred forty cannons (Austin, 58). The battle only lasted a few days, but within the few hours of intense fighting, some eighty thousand men were slain. Napoleon lost thirty-five thousand soldiers, and the Russians lost forty-five thousand soldiers. The war ended with Kutuzov's order to retreat on September 8. On September 12, 1812, Napoleon reached Moscow. The remaining one hundred thousand French troops entered the mostly deserted town only to see close to seventy-five thousand Russian troops. The French soldiers were slaughtered. Russian soldiers had strategically placed themselves in sniper positions and they new the winding roads of Moscow. Napoleon was able to capture the prized city of Moscow, after losing close to twenty-five thousand men (Saglamer, Moscow). The soldiers pillaged the stores and houses in order to obtain blankets and food for the cold winter months. Unfortunately, the fleeing Russians set fire to the city. Within three days, four-fifths of the city was burnt. Napoleon and his troops were in the middle of a burnt city. The goal of the invasion of Russia was to capture Moscow, the heart of Russia, and now the prized city was burnt down to the ground. The troops were not able to obtain enough food and supplies due to the fire. Soldiers began to die by the hundreds because of the extreme cold and lack of supplies. Napoleon traveled thousands of miles to conquer Russia. He achieved his goal of taking Moscow, but in the end fires smashed his dream. Napoleon fell ill because of the horribly cold weather and fled back to France. Abandoning his troops, Napoleon left control of the Grand Armée to his second in charge, General Murat. After waiting in vain for Alexander I to offer to negotiate, Napoleon ordered his troops to begin the march home. Kutuzov, the Russia general’s, forces blocked the route south, and the French were in no shape for a battle. The retreat retraced the long, devastated route of the invasion. Having waited until mid-September to depart, the exhausted French army soon found itself in the midst of winter. In fact, this winter was unusually early and especially cold winter (Broers, 235). Temperatures soon dropped well below freezing. Cossacks attacked stragglers and isolated units, and Food was almost non-existent. When the not so Grand Armée arrived in France, it was reduced to ten thousand freezing, hungry soldiers (236). From 1799 to 1815, the greater part of continental Europe was dominated by Napoleon (11). After the failure of the Treaty of Tilsit, relations between Russia and France began to deteriorate. The decision to invade Russia in 1812 was a horrible mistake on Napoleon’s part. Four hundred thousand troops of the original half million members of the Grand Armée lost their lives in a hopeless cause. One hundred-fifty thousand horses of the original quarter million died of colic, horrible winter weather and other various reasons (Elting, 244). After achieving his goal of conquering Moscow, Napoleon fell terribly sick from the flu, almost losing his life. He abandoned his troops, and he fled back to France, arriving months ahead of them. When the word spread of Napoleon’s defeat, continental Europe began to lose faith in their once invincible Napoleon. By the end of 1813, Prussia had dropped all treaty agreements with France. Austria had formed a separate peace agreement with Russia. The tides had turned on Napoleon’s once great Empire. In 1814, Napoleon was forced to abdicate his throne. He was exiled to a small island in the Mediterranean called Elba. After a year, Napoleon was able to make an escape from Elba and flee to France. During the “Hundred Days,” Napoleon was able to raise another Grand Armée, but not grand enough to defeat the English at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. After his defeat, Napoleon was exiled to St. Helena, a remote island in the South Atlantic Ocean. The remoteness of St. Helena made it close to impossible to escape. Napoleon remained at St. Helena until his death from stomach cancer on May 5, 1821 (Connelly, Temple of Napoleon). Bibliography Books: 1. Austin, Paul. 1812: Napoleon in Moscow. Greenhill Books, London & Pennsylvania. 1995. 2. Broers, Michael. Europe Under Napoleon 1799-1815. Arnold Headline Group, New York. 1996. 3. Elting, John. Swords Around a Thrown: Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Da Capo Press, New York. 1997. 4. Palmer, R. France Under Napoleon. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 1990. Internet: 1. Connelly, Owen. Tempe of Napoleon. http://sangha.net/messengers/napoleon.htm 2. Minard. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~jrubarth/gslis/lis385t.16/Napoleon/ 3. Russian Embassy. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. http://www.interknowledge.com/russia/rushis05.htm 4. Saglamer, Emin. 1812: Napoleon's March to Russia. http://www.ddg.com/LIS/InfoDesignF96/Emin/napoleon/textindex.html 5. Unknown. Napoleon is Russia: 1812. http://home.rmci.net/toddjohnson/russia.htm The map, based on the 1869 chart by Minard, graphically illustrates (both literally and figuratively) how the size of the French army dwindled during the march into Russia and was reduced to almost nothing on the wretched rout back into Poland. The map can be read in several ways. The size of the peach colored bar indicates the relative strength of the French army during the march on Moscow. The black bar shows the dwindling French army during the retreat. In the lower portion of the map, the temperature in degrees Celsius is shown, along with dates during the retreat.




Napoleon's Russian Campaign Napoleons Russian Campaign Eli Kamara The peace between France and Russia in 1807 lasted for five years but was not satisfactory to either side. The Tilsit settlement was thought of by Napoleon as no more than a convenient truce. In 1807 he had been in no position to invade Russia but there was no way that he could tolerate another European power for very long. Napoleon felt that a war with Russia was necessary ‘for crushing England by crushing the only power still strong enough him any trouble by joining her.’ Napoleon began preparing for the war. He secured the support of Austria and Prussia since even though neither was in any position to refuse. Emperor Francis of Austria provided 34,000 men to cover the French but sent secret messages to St. Petersburg assuring Alexander that Austrian hostilities would be kept to a minimum. Prussia though was placed in a less fortunate position. With Berlin occupied by French and most of their 1807 debt to be paid it had no alternative but to provide 25,000 men and supply quarters and rations for the entire army. The rest of Napoleon’s Grand Army came from the many countries under his direct control. The Kingdom of Italy sent 45,000 men, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 35,000. The Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony and Westphalia each sent 17,000 men and there were many additions from various other nations under Napoleon’s control. In all the army totaled to 600,000 men. While Napoleon had an enormous army he made though inadequate preparations for supplying the troops. The provisions that he arranged for were not intended to provide all that the troops would need as they fought their way to Moscow. This was because Napoleon visualized a short campaign ending in a decisive victory. In a speech to his troops on June 22 he announced that ‘In less than two months time the Russians will be asking for peace.’ His main striking force consisted of 235,000 men. Two smaller forces, each of 70,000 men and commanded by Eugene Beauharna and Jerome Bonaparte, were back on his right, and the wings were covered by Prussian and Austrian troops. The attacking force alone consisted of 375,000 men with more than 100,000 horses and would be advancing on a narrow front. Where after the first wave of men and horses had passed there would not be a blade of grass left to feed those who followed. In the space between the Klaipeda and the Pripet marshes lay two Russian armies. Barclay de Tolly's First Army of the West, which consisted of 110,000 strong men, was around Vilna and to their left was Prince Bagration’s Second Army of the West, which consisted of 60,000 men. The Third Army of the West under Tormasov consisted of 45,000 men that were mostly recruits. It was stationed to the south of the marshes, and had the task of keeping the Austrians under observation. There were also many other Russian armies being formed and larger armies from Finland and Romania were marching towards the Polish front. In the summer of 1812 though only the 215,00 men from the three Armies of the West were available to fight against the half million of the Grand Army. Napoleon's plan was to separate Barclay's army from Bagration and to defeat Barclay while Eugene and Jerome kept Bagration busy. The Czar had adopted a plan made by Ernst von Phull, a Prussian colonel. His plan was more of a defensive strategy. He planned that Barclay would fall back 150 miles to the town of Drissa on the East Bank of the Dvina River. There, Barclay’s army would remain in a camp fortified and entrenched and wait for Napoleon. The Czar gave Barclay the task of coordinating the movements of the First and Second Armies according to the plan. Bagration (commander of the Second Army) though was a higher-ranking officer than Barclay and did not want to listen to anything Barclay had to say. This produced some problems in the future. On June 24th the French crossed the Niemen River into Russian territory and were unopposed. After four days Napoleon reached Vilna and even though no battles had been fought yet he declared ‘My maneuvers have disconcerted the Russians, before a month has passed they will be on their knees to me.’ Already though there was a food shortage and 5,000 horses died from being fed green rye. 100 guns and 500 ammunition wagons had to be abandoned. Barclay fell back as planned but when he reached the camp in Drissa he found that it was too small and would be difficult to defend. Napoleon meanwhile was traveling through the gap between the two Russian armies and was marching toward Vitebsk. There Napoleon was 280 miles from his main camp but there was no decisive battle to be fought which was the basis of his plan and he was also already far beyond the reach of his supply train. He was faced with many problems at this time. The wagons carrying the supplies were built for hard roads and were not appropriate for traveling across the Russian terrain. Half of the horses the army began with were already sick or dead and the infantry were not in good condition. At this point Napoleon had two options. He could wait at Vitebsk for a battle or he could continue traveling seeking a battle. Napoleon himself wanted to go on looking for a fight but his many officers advised him not to. On August 8th though, Cossacks attacked some French cavalry at Inkovo. This was more than enough to convince Napoleon that the Russians wanted a fight. He decided to continue the advance, going deeper into Russian territory. When he reached Smolensk Napoleon had almost succeeded in forcing a major battle with Barclay and Bagration. Barclay was held under a lot of pressure from the senior officers to stop retreating. Finally, Barclay agreed to counter-attack Napoleon with the First and Second Armies from Smolensk. The tension between Bagration and Barclay was high, thereby creating coordination problems. At Smolensk, Barclay’s army was anxiously guarding the city’s right side. Napoleon though swung around to the Russian's left side, crossed the Dnieper River and attacked the city from the south. A courageous rearguard action by a group of 9,500 Russian soldiers under General Neverovsky gained enough time for the First and Second Western Armies to unite in the city and hear Barclay’s command. Bargation and most of the generals were determined to make a stand but Barclay disagreed with them. He recognized that his heavily outnumbered army would be destroyed in a battle and insisted on a retreat. He overrode the generals’ decision to stand and ordered a retreat on August 17th. For the other Russian Generals this was the last straw. They dispatched an ultimatum to the Czar in St. Petersburg demanding the dismissal of Barclay from First and Second Army coordinator. As it turned out Alexander had already decided to appoint 67 year-old Kutusov to the supreme command position. Alexander disliked and distrusted Kutusov but knew that he was greatly admired by the Russian generals as well as the army. In Smolensk the French found lots of supplies so Napoleon ordered his troops to stop and rest. The decision did not stand for very long though. Murat, the commander of the advance guard reported, with very little evidence, that the Russians were making a stand. Once more the hope of a decisive victory drew Napoleon forward. On August 29 though the Russian army was still retreating and Kutusov (the new commander-in-chief) joined them west of Gzhatsk. He continued Barclay’s policy of retreating until September 3rd, when he reached a defensive position near Borodino. He was joined by reinforcements to give him equality in numbers with Napoleon. With the fresh troops he decided to no longer postpone the major battle with the French. Napoleon attacked the Borodino position on September 7th. The "Battle of Moskva," as the French called it, was one of the bloodiest fought before the twentieth century. Kutusov stationed himself to the rear and left the tactical control to Barclay and Bagration, both of which didn’t cooperate with each other at all. Napoleon’s battle plan was to have a series of frontal attacks. Once most of Kutusov’s positions had been stormed though, Napoleon became sluggish. He refused to commit the Imperial Guard to make a final thrust which might have given him the overwhelming victory he needed so badly. Bravery was shown by the troops on both sides but the carelessness on the part of their Generals was evident in the casualty lists. The French lost 30,000 men, the Russians 44,000 including Prince Bagration who died of wounds. The Russians though were clearly more able to handle their major loss. They had unlimited reserves of manpower behind them while Napoleon was 500 miles from his base and 1,500 from his country. Napoleon though was now driven forward by the belief that the capture of Russia’s capital city, Moscow, would end the war. In a speech to his troops Napoleon said that ‘Peace lies in Moscow. When the Great Russian nobles see us masters of their capital they will think twice before continuing the war.’ Kutusov realized that any defense of the city against Napoleon would be senseless. He declared in a message to Alexander that ‘I see my first duty as the preservation of the army. The loss of Moscow does not mean the loss of Russia.’ With that he withdrew his forces and told the citizens of Moscow to begin evacuating. The French entered a deserted Moscow on September 14th without further fighting. That evening though the city caught fire and burned until rains put the flames out six days later. About a sixth of the buildings were destroyed. From Moscow Napoleon sent peace proposals to the Czar. He received no reply from Alexander who promised his army that he would never go through with any peace treaty with Napoleon, which left Napoleon with three options. First, he could stay in Moscow and hope that the army, which had no winter clothing, could find enough food and supplies to last through the Russian winter. Even though a lot of food had been found in Moscow it was clear that it wouldn’t last till spring. Second, he could retreat to Poland or some place in Russia where he was closer to his supply trains and depots. He feared though that a retreat would degrade himself and his prestige and would tempt Austria and Prussia to break away from him. The third option was to go south and head for Ukraine. If he did this though he would not avoid a confrontation against the growing Russian army. He would have to face and defeat Kutusov if this was to be successful. Faced with these unattractive options Napoleon decided to wait and hope for a reply from the Czar. While the French were sitting in Moscow the Russian army was retreating to Tarutino, 50 miles from Moscow. This retreat made Kutusov as unpopular among the Russian generals as Barclay was at Smolensk. He was accused of cowardice and of being on the French side. Kutusov knew though that Napoleon must retreat and that the later Napoleon did, the more damage there would be done to the French army. He was persuaded though to mount a limited attack against Murat’s advanced cavalry, which was carelessly encamped at Vinkovo. Kutusov organized a night attack, which completely surprised Murat’s forces. They lost 2,500 men and 38 guns. Three days earlier, on October 15th Napoleon gave orders for the evacuation of Moscow to take place on October 20th. Napoleon’s intention was to put his army into winter quarters in the Smolensk, Vitebsk, and Minsk areas where there were enormous amounts of supplies that were guarded by the troops of Marshal Victor. His orders were for the move to take place on the Kaluga road because the direct road was already stripped bare of all provisions. Murat’s defeat at Vinkovo pressured him to put the evacuation forward by one day. On October 19th hundreds of troops, led by the advance guard of Prince Eugene and his Italian troops, poured out of Moscow in ‘Three Great Columns’ and began moving towards Smolensk. The Russian general’s first assumed that the move of Prince Eugene was no more than an unusually strong expedition and to leave it alone. They later though discovered what it really was and decided to move against it, and after a day of fighting Kutusov held the French army at Maloyaroslavets on October 24th. Napoleon realized that here was the opportunity of fighting the decisive battle, which he had originally wanted. Now thought that it was offered to him he could not afford the risk. Another battle like Borodino would destroy his army. He decided to go towards the main road even though his army could starve that way. Since Kutusov also had decided not to fight at Maloyaroslavets the strategic direction of the Russian armies was taken from him and given to Alexander. From St. Petersburg the Czar made a plan to surround and crush the Grand Army. From the north, General Wittgenstein with troops that had been guarding St. Petersburg and troops from Finland was going to block the gap between the Dvina and Bersina rivers. From the south, Admiral Tchitchagov with the Third Army and 35,00 troops from Danube was going to take control of the line of Bersina, therefore blocking the French retreat. Kutusov’s army was given the role of pursuing the French army so they would not get any rest until the wall formed by the Wittgenstein and Tchitchagov armies blocked them off. When the French finally reached Smolensk on November 8th they found that Marshal Victor and his troops had marched north to hold Witetgenstein back and they had taken most of the provisions with them. The distribution of what remained was extremely unfair, with many troops getting nothing. By this time the army was down to 49,000 men. Napoleon decided to continue the retreat. On November 15th though, General Miloradovitch, commanding Kutusov’s advanced guard, ambushed the Italian corps. Prince Eugene and his men fought their way out with 900 men left from the original 5,000. Napoleon had another problem when on November 18th, Kutusov’s army cut off the French rearguard, which consisted of 15,000 men under the control of Davout and Ney. Napoleon turned back to rescue the two marshals. Davout and Ney eventually made it back to the rest of the army on November 21st with 850 men left. More bad news came to the French when they found out that Tchitchagov had taken Minsk, the huge supply depot, which Napoleon was depending on for his army’s rations. Also on November 16th Tchitchagov had reached Borisov and destroyed the bridge that crossed over the Berezina River. The river was 600 yards long in width and needed to be crossed in order for the French to escape Russia. Napoleon’s chief engineer though, General Eble, thought out a plan for building a temporarily stable bridge over the river. He went 8 miles north to work at Studianka to build two bridges from wood taken off of houses. Between November 26th and 29th 25,000 French troops walked across the river on Eble’s bridge and went through the snow towards Vilna. Russia was free of most French troops, except prisoners, by mid-December. The French headquarters after the retreat were at Smorgon, a village east of Vilna. On December 5th Napoleon decided to leave the army and return to France, leaving Murat in command. He was worried that if he stayed with the army that his grip on Europe would be loosened and that Prussia and Austria would try to break away from his empire. Napoleon blamed the failure of the campaign on the weather and stated that if he had stayed only four days less in Moscow that he would be on the Russian throne. He did not though, realize how big of a disaster had just taken place. He held on to the belief that he still had 150,000 men on the eastern front and that they could hold the Russians at bay. What was left of the Grand Army though could not hold Vilna. There were not enough men and there was almost no will to fight. On December 13th the remaining 400 infantry and 600 cavalry burned the bridge over the Niemen River at Kovno and marched into East Prussia. Russia though made a deal with East Prussia, which allowed the Russian troops to enter East Prussia and by the end of January 1813 the French were behind the Elbe River, far away from Russia. This marked the end of Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. Bibliography Gate, Curtis. The War Of The Two Emperors New York: Random House, 1985. Glover, Michael. The Napoleonic Wars: An Illustrated History New York: Hippocrene Books, 1979. Hilt, Douglas. Ten Against Napoleon Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. Holtman, Robert. The Napoleonic Revolution Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1967. Nicolson, Nigel. Napoleon 1812 New York: Harper & Row, 1985. Riehn, Richard. 1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign San Francisco: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990. Walter, Jacob. The Diary Of A Napoleonic Foot Soldier London: Doubleday, 1991.